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This study attempts to ascertain whether particular structural arrangements and demo- 
graphic features of a community were responsible for especially severe disturbances 
during the 1960s. Preliminary to addressing this question, consideration is given to the 
manner of measuring severity and to the volatile components of this phenomenon. With 
respect to the latter, it is found that (1) disorder severity declined as a function of the 
number of prior outbreaks in a city and (2) there is evidence for a temporal effect, with 
the post-Martin Luther King-assassination disturbances having been unusually destruc- 
tive. Regarding the more stable (community) determinants of disorder severity, only 
Negro population size and a dummy term for South were found to be related to severity. 
Net of these variables, various indicators of Negro disadvantage in a community failed 
to reveal significant associations with severity. This result is interpreted as further 
evidence for the distinctly national character of the disturbances in the 1960s. 
The issue of disorder severity is con- 
ceptually a separate matter from account- 
ing for the locations of disturbances. This 
distinction was recognized by Wanderer 
(1969), although the particular procedures 
he employed to analyze the severity of 
racial incidents which took place during 
1967 have been criticized (Spilerman, 
1970a). The rationale for distinguishing 
between the determinants of disorder loca- 
tion and the determinants of severity can 
be illustrated most compellingly with re- 
spect to the organization and training of 
social control forces: it may be impossible 
for the police to react with sufficient alac- 
rity to prevent the occurrence of most 
"spontaneous" 1 collective outbursts (es- 
pecially if an inclusive definition of dis- 
order requiring a low level of violence is 
used); nevertheless, their manner of re- 
sponse may be an important determinant 
of the intensity to which an incident will 
escalate.2 
* The research reported here was supported 
by funds granted to the Institute for Research 
on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by 
the Office of Economic Opportunity, pursuant to 
provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964. An earlier version of this paper was pre- 
sented at the national meetings of the American 
Sociological Association in Denver, Colorado, 
September, 1971. I wish to thank David Dickens 
for assistance with the statistical computations. 
The conclusions are the sole responsibility of the 
author. 
1 What is intended by this expression are dis- 
turbances which were not outgrowths from 
planned confrontations such as civil rights dem- 
onstrations. The precipitants of "spontaneous" 
disorders typically were the kind of incidents that 
occur frequently in American cities and are usu- 
ally disposed of in routine fashion (such as an 
arrest on a ghetto streetcorner) or unanticipated 
events of profound significance concerning which 
information was propagated by television (e.g., 
the assassination of Martin Luther King). Most 
of the racial disturbances during the 1960s had 
such origins. 
2 There is a widespread belief that police tactics 
and manner of response to an incipient dis- 
turbance can restrain or exacerbate the intensity 
of the incident. For example, the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (1963) recom- 
mends the following procedures for controlling 
hostile outbursts: extricate the leaders; cordon 
the area to prevent recruits to the mob from 
entering; fragment the crowd into small isolated 
groups; introduce plainclothesmen to inject com- 
peting slogans and raise divisive issues (Milgram 
and Toch 1969:579). Also consult Smelser 
(1963:261-8) for related comments. 
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A plausible argument also can be made 
to the effect that the variation across com- 
munities in severity of collective aggres- 
sion will reflect differences among them 
in the degree of discontent experienced 
by their inhabitants. With respect to racial 
turmoil in the 1960s, it has been reported 
that the disturbance locations were unre- 
lated to a number of objective indicators 
of Negro social and economic status or 
to their living conditions in a city (Spiler- 
man 1970b; 1971). This lack of signifi- 
cance of the community characteristics was 
interpreted as evidence for a thesis that 
the frustrations which provoked ghetto 
residents during this period were nation- 
wide in impact and not rooted in circum- 
stances peculiar to the stricken communi- 
ties. Instead, an explanation was proposed 
which emphasized the wide availability of 
television and the role of network news 
programs in exposing Negroes uniformly to 
stimuli of a frustrating nature, and in 
propagating in all cities the same role mod- 
els regarding how ghetto residents in some 
communities were responding to the de- 
privations endemic to Negro life in Amer- 
ica. 
However, an assessment hat community 
conditions were altogether irrelevant o the 
riot process would constitute an overin- 
terpretation of those empirical findings 
since the preceding studies examined only 
the determinants of disorder location (i.e., 
outbreak frequency in a city). It still may 
be the case that the frustrations felt by 
Negroes which derive from their local situ- 
ations are salient to other aspects of the 
disturbance process. In this regard, there 
is certainly reason to expect community 
differences to exist in the level of Negro 
discontent. The conditions under which 
they live vary enormously among cities, in 
absolute terms and relative to white cir- 
cumstance. For instance, in 1960, the 
range in median Negro income was $1,880 
to $9,079; relative to median white income 
the range was .30 to 1.19.3 Disparities of 
such magnitude must mean that an indi- 
vidual's life chances, and a social group's 
ability to organize and effectively promote 
its collective interests, are conditioned in 
dramatically different ways from one com- 
munity to the next. It is not unreasonable 
to expect corresponding variations to be 
present in the degree of frustration that 
is experienced by Negro residents in these 
cities. 
There is precedent for proposing that the 
frustrations may come to be expressed in 
the intensity of a release, if not in the fre- 
quency of outbreak. Evidence from labora- 
tory studies underscores the importance of 
the intensity variable. For example, Berko- 
witz (1965) reports that angered subjects 
sent shocks of greater frequency and dura- 
tion to stooges; Baron (1971) observed 
that anger arousal motivated shocks of 
high severity; and Zimbardo (1969) de- 
scribes a laboratory study in which aggres- 
sion was expressed in shock duration, even 
though frequency was permitted to vary. 
With respect to collective behavior in natu- 
ral settings, it also has been suggested that 
"the fury of the destructive reaction will 
vary with the indignity of the disappoint- 
ment" (Milgram and Toch, 1969:549 
paraphrasing Dollard et al., 1939). 
The argument as to why frustration may 
come to be expressed in severity of aggres- 
sion, rather than in frequency, can be made 
in the following way. In our society, acts of 
collective violence are inhibited by deep- 
rooted mores as well as by a fear of ap- 
prehension and punishment. In fact, despite 
the large number of racial disturbances 
during the 1960s, a disorder was actually 
a rare event in any given community. 
While some 170 cities (from among the 
673 with 1960 populations exceeding 25, 
000) did experience some racial turmoil 
during 1961-68, fewer than ten cities 
witnessed more than five disturbances dur- 
ing that eight-year interval.4 Viewed from 
3 Figures are from the 1960 Census of Popu- 
lation (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963) and 
pertain to the 413 communities in the contiguous 
United States with total population exceeding 
25,000 and Negro population in excess of 1,000. 
4Figures in this paper which pertain to the 
location of racial disturbances during the 1960s 
were computed from the data set used in the 
author's earlier investigations (Spilerman 1970b; 
1971). To be included in that data set, an in- 
cident had to involve at least 30 participants, be 
characterized by primarily Negro aggression, and 
be "spontaneous" in origin. For additional details 
on the definition and categorization of the dis- 
turbances, see Spilerman (1970b:630). 
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this perspective, even during a decade of 
great urban unrest the inhibitions which 
normally deter hostile outbursts appear to 
have been overcome only infrequently in 
a particular community. 
Breaching the barriers against collective 
violence may require a precipitant of im- 
mense significance. Indeed, 168 of the 341 
racial disturbances can be associated with 
one of two extraordinary events: the mas- 
sive Newark riot of 1967 (which received 
extensive television coverage) or the assas- 
sination of Martin Luther King. Once the 
inhibitions against violence have been over- 
come, however, it is conceivable that the 
severity of the resulting outburst will be 
conditioned by the frustrations which have 
accumulated among Negroes in the com- 
munity from years of deprivation and pow- 
erlessness. As Smelser (1963 :259) has ob- 
served, "Once hostile outbursts begin . . . 
they become a sign that a fissure has 
opened in the social order, and that the 
situation is now structurally conducive for 
the expression of hostility." With regard 
to disturbances during the 1960s, evidence 
in support of a relation between commu- 
nity-based deprivations and riot severity 
has been reported by several investigators, 
principally Downes (1968) and Morgan 
and Clark (1973). The latter (1973:622) 
are most emphatic in their conclusion: 
"Cities with a higher grievance level among 
blacks . . . had higher rates of disorder 
participation and hence more severe dis- 
orders." 
Two additional factors warrant consid- 
eration. First, apart from the relevance of 
the social and economic organization of 
a community, there is a possibility that 
an outbreak of violence will alter the ex- 
pected intensity of a subsequent disorder 
in the same city. The most reasonable 
conjecture is that later disturbances would 
be less severe since the initial event would 
have stimulated police preparation and 
training in crowd control procedures.5 
Second, superimposed upon the foregoing 
processes, a time trend may exist in dis- 
order severity. For instance, the disturb- 
ances subsequent to the assassination of 
Martin Luther King may have been un- 
usually destructive and violent because of 
the intensity of bereavement among Ne- 
groes. Or, just as the police in a city 
which has experienced a disorder may be 
motivated to routinize their crowd con- 
trol techniques, these tactics might become 
more widely diffused as other communi- 
ties recognize that they may not be im- 
mune to racial turmoil. Thus, with the 
passage of time, the severity of even a first 
racial incident in a city might decline. 
The above comments constitute a ra- 
tionale for investigating the variation in 
disorder severity, and for doing so with 
reference to several categories of potential 
determinants: the social and economic situ- 
ation of Negroes in a community, the 
preparation by social control forces, the 
prior disturbance history of the commu- 
nity, and the location in time of the inci- 
dent. In the following section, preliminary 
to examining the correlates of severity for 
the disorders of the 1960s, we discuss the 
specification and measurement of this con- 
struct. 
Measurement of Disorder Severity 
The measurement of disorder severity 
raises several conceptual and methodologi- 
cal issues. One matter concerns the ques- 
tion of dimensionality. Wanderer (1968), 
Downes (1970) and Morgan and Clark 
(1973) all have treated severity as a 
unidimensional concept. Indeed, Wanderer 
reports that the 75 incidents which he 
analyzed form an eight-category Guttman 
scale.6 In our considerably more extensive 
data set (322 incidents), information on 
aspects of disorder severity is not sys- 
5 One police innovation designed to reduce 
tension and quell turmoil involved the deploy- 
ment of "youth patrols." In a number of cities, 
ghetto youth were encouraged to form police 
auxiliaries and patrol their neighborhoods at the 
onset of rioting. Knopf (1969), in an examina- 
tion of the effectiveness of these groups in 12 
instances of civil disorder, credits them with 
restraining the level of violence. 
6 Wanderer's severity scale contains the follow- 
ing items: (0) No scale items; (1) Vandalism; 
(2) All of the above plus interference with fire- 
men; (3) All of the above plus looting; (4) All 
of the above plus sniping; (5) All of the above 
plus called state police; (6) All of the above plus 
called National Guard; (7) All of the above plus 
law officer or civilian killed (Wanderer, 1968: 
196-7). 
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Table 1. Riot Severity Scale 
0. Low intensity-rock and bottle throwing, some fighting, little property damage. Crowd size < 125; 
arrests < 15; injuries < 8. 
1. Rock and bottle throwing, fighting, looting, serious property damage, some arson. Crowd size 
75-250; arrests 10-30; injuries 5-15. 
2. Substantial violence, looting, arson, and property destruction. Crowd size 200-500; arrests 25-75; 
injuries 10-40. 
3. High intensity-major violence, bloodshed and destruction. Crowd size >400; arrests>65; in- 
juries > 35. 
tematically available. However, the few 
inter-correlations which can be computed 
among the component indicators are large 
and suggest that a unidimensionality as- 
sumption is not unreasonable.7 We will 
proceed here under this assumption; addi- 
tional evidence to support unidimension- 
ality will be presented in a later section. 
A second issue concerns specification of 
the severity scale categories and selection 
of items appropriate to the construct. On 
this matter, we have three disagreements 
with Wanderer concerning strategy in scale 
construction. (1) The items he used are 
all qualitative and, hence, insensitive to 
the magnitude of an activity type. For in- 
stance, two successive items in his scale are 
"all of the above plus looting" and "all 
of the above plus sniping." An incident 
of brief duration, with a minor amount of 
looting and one or two snipers (who cause 
no injuries), would be scaled by Wanderer 
as more severe than a disorder lacking a 
sniper but having thousands of looters and 
vandals, engaged in running battles with 
the police for many hours, and resulting 
in numerous injuries and arrests. Intui- 
tively, we prefer to consider the latter a 
more severe disturbance. (2) Wanderer's 
scale omits items which we believe should 
be major components of a disorder sever- 
ity instrument: crowd size, number ar- 
rested, and number injured. (3) Two of 
his categories-"called National Guard" 
and "called state police"-confound an 
organizational response to rioting with the 
intensity of the stimulus. An implication 
of this latter point will be considered at 
the end of the present section. 
Using data much the same as ours. 
Downes (1968; 1970) constructed a four- 
category ordinal scale which incorporates 
quantitative information on the extent of 
several kinds of riot activities.8 We chose 
to use a somewhat more elaborate version 
of Downes' scale (Table 1), the main dif- 
ference being that our instrument specifies 
numerical bounds at each scale level for 
crowd size, number of arrests, and num- 
ber of injuries to supplement the descrip- 
tive information pertaining to severity. The 
bounds were specified to overlap one an- 
other because the component aspects of 
severity are not perfectly correlated. Some 
disturbances have large crowds but few in- 
juries, while other incidents with relatively 
few participants may be exceedingly san- 
guinary and result in a great many injuries. 
In assessing severity, the coders were in- 
structed to use the bounds as guides, in 
conjunction with the descriptive materials 
on a disorder, rather than to code in an 
inflexible manner. 
A final issue concerns measurement 
properties of the severity scale. Whereas 
Downes utilized ordinal ranks in his com- 
putations, we chose to assign interval 
scores to the categories, in recognition of 
the fact that our knowledge about the 
scale levels exceeds rank order informa- 
7 The correlations among severity components 
are reported in Table 2, following the discussion 
of data characteristics. 
Downes' severity scale consists of the follow- 
ing items: (0) Low intensity-rock and bottle 
throwing, window breaking, fighting; (1) Medium 
intensity-the above plus some looting and arson; 
(2) High intensity-the above plus much looting 
and arson, reports of sniping; (3) Very high 
intensity-the above plus widespread looting and 
arson, sniping (Downes, 1968:519). Downes in- 
cluded an additional severity category for cities 
not experiencing a disorder, which he ranked 
below "low intensity." It was properly (in our 
opinion) omitted in his second paper (Downes, 
1970:355-6). 
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tion. For instance, it was apparent to the 
coders that the disorders at each succes- 
sively higher rank were, on average, con- 
siderably more severe than ones in the 
preceding category. Interval values were 
assigned to the rank differences in the fol- 
lowing manner: after classifying all inci- 
dents, each coder was instructed to con- 
sider the disparity between category 1 and 
category 0 disorders as equal to one unit 
of intensity, and then to estimate the sever- 
ity difference between category 2 and cate- 
gory 0 disorders, and between category 
3 and category 0 disorders. The values 
they assigned were very close and averaged 
to the scale scores 0, 1, 4, 12, correspond- 
ing to the ranks, 0, 1, 2, 3. These interval 
values define the dependent variable in 
the main analyses to be reported in this 
paper. 
Our primary data sources were Lem- 
berg Center (1968a; 1968b) and the New 
York Times Index. Newspaper accounts 
and the Civil Disorder Chronology (Con- 
gressional Quarterly, 1967) were con- 
sulted in reference to the pre-1967 dis- 
turbances, but information concerning 
those events was too sketchy to permit 
reliable classification in terms of severity. 
The incidents analyzed in this study, there- 
fore, are limited to the period 1967-68. 
Three hundred and twenty-two events satis- 
fied the minimal criteria of violence neces- 
sary for consideration as disorders (Spiler- 
man, 1970b:630) and were used in the 
analysis.9 
Following the instructions outlined 
above, two coders, working independently, 
classified all incidents. Where information 
on some aspect of severity was missing,'0 
they were instructed to assign the incident 
to a rank category on the basis of available 
data. Agreement between the coders was 
obtained in 96 percent of the disorders. 
In every instance of disagreement, a single 
rank difference was involved and the mat- 
ter was resolved by averaging the two 
values. 
To validate the resulting scale as a sever- 
ity instrument, the component variables 
(number of arrests, number of injuries, 
and crowd size), the three-category sever- 
ity classification employed in the Kerner 
Report (National Advisory Commission, 
1968:65) in conjunction with the 1967 
disorders, and the composite indices de- 
scribed in this paper were inter-correlated 
using a pairwise-present calculation. The 
results are presented in Table 2 and reveal 
a substantial correspondence between our 
indices and the other measures of severity. 
Inclusion of organizational response 
items in the severity scale. In the preceding 
section, we suggested that the inclusion 
of items such as "called state police" and 
"called National Guard" in a severity scale 
would confound an organizational response 
to a disturbance with the intensity of the 
stimulus. This is an undesirable situation 
because the kind of external assistance 
which is provided to a city may be a func- 
tion of its structure and demography, in 
addition to the severity of the incident. 
This contention is elaborated upon here. 
The particular scale items cited above 
are among those used by Wanderer (1968: 
197) to define severity levels. He consid- 
ered "called National Guard" (item 6 in 
footnote 6) as indicating greater disorder 
severity than "called state police" (item 5). 9 Because the unit of observation here is the 
disturbance, not the potential riot site, community 
characteristics had to be collected only for cities 
which experienced racial turmoil. This permitted 
the inclusion of incidents which occurred in cities 
with populations less than 25,000. (These were 
omitted from the riot location studies because 
systematic information on small cities is absent 
in the Alford-Aiken data file, our primary source 
of data on the independent variables.) Forty-five 
incidents in small cities are contained in our 
figure of 322. Due to the large amount of miss- 
ing data on characteristics of small communities, 
approximately half of these added disturbances 
subsequently were eliminated from the main 
analyses. 
10 Data on number of arrests were available for 
294 incidents; information on number of injuries 
was recorded for 258 disorders. Crowd size was 
reported less systematically: sometimes a range 
was specified; in other instances, statements were 
written such as "a crowd estimated to be larger 
than . . ." or "a small band of Negro youth." In 
209 cases the coders were able to estimate ap- 
proximate crowd size in terms of the following 
scale: (0) less than 100 participants; (1) 100- 
300 participants; (2) 300-700 participants; (3) 
more than 700 participants. Clearly, the very 
notion of "participation" is ill-defined, and this 
index should be recognized as subject to much 
error. 
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Table 2. Intercorrelations" among Severity Components and the Composite Scales 
Severity Crowd Kerner 
(0-12) Arrestsh Injuriesb Size e Indexd 
Severity Scale (0-3) .893 .769 .754 .570 .597 
Severity Scale- (0-12) .712 .741 .586 .676 
Arrests .684 .533 .489 
Injuries .566 .537 
Crowd Size .444 
Ne 322 294 258 209 145 
a Pairwise present correlations were calculated. 
log (X + 1). 
e Crowd size was coded 0, 1, 5, 18 in accordance with coder estimates of crowd size at each rank. 
We point out that these values are close to the ones which Abelson and Tukey (1959:228) recom- 
mend when information exceeds rank order knowledge and increasing intervals can be assumed. 
d Kerner index was coded 0 to 2. 
e Number of observations in correlations with the composite severity scales. 
An alternate possibility, however, is that 
communities with particular structural and 
demographic features will tend to specialize 
in obtaining one or another form of out- 
side assistance. In particular, for a given 
level of severity (as measured by the ex- 
tent of violence), we suggest that large 
communities will be less likely than small 
places to receive state police aid. The rea- 
sons for this assertion are the following: 
(1) because of their sizable police forces, 
large cities are less likely to require ex- 
ternal assistance of any sort; (2) in many 
states the state police have a primarily 
rural and small town jurisdiction; (3) con- 
sidering the amount of assistance that 
would be necessary to effectively reinforce 
local police authorities in a large commu- 
nity when they cannot quell a disturbance, 
a substantial redeployment of state troop- 
ers, from many jurisdictions, would be 
required to provide sufficient manpower. 
For these reasons, when external assistance 
is requested by large cities we expect the 
National Guard to be mobilized, rather 
than the state police to be called. 
An analogous difficulty regarding the 
inclusion of organizational response items 
in a severity scale involves the possibility 
of anticipatory deployment of external per- 
sonnel. Following the assassination of Mar- 
tin Luther King, for example, National 
Guard troops were dispatched to many 
cities in the expectation of violence and 
turmoil. Consequently, it is possible that 
the item "called National Guard," rather 
than having disorder severity as a pure 
stimulus, is contaminated instead by other 
considerations." 
To convey more concretely the import 
of the foregoing objections to the inclusion 
of organizational response items in a sever- 
ity scale, dummy variables for "called Na- 
tional Guard" and "called state police" 
were regressed against our measure of dis- 
order severity and against terms for city 
size, region, and time period12 The entries 
in column (1) of Table 3 are ufstandard- 
ized regression coefficients corresponding 
to the dependent variable "called state po- 
11 In fairness to Wanderer, it should be noted 
that the post-Martin Luther King-assassination 
period was not included in his study, which was 
restricted to disturbances during 1967. 
12There is a statistical problem in using a 
dichotomous dependent variable because the as- 
sumption of homoscedasticity is no longer valid. 
The least squares estimators of the regression co- 
efficients still will be unbiased but their standard 
errors will be biased and inconsistent. One alter- 
native is to use the two-stage method described 
by Goldberger (1964:248-50). This procedure 
was applied here with the first stage predictions 
restricted to the ranges (.1, .9), (.06, .94) and 
(.03, .97), which has the effect of permitting ob- 
servations at the end points of an interval to 
contribute, respectively, 1.6, 2.1 and 3.0 times 
the weight of an observation at the midpoint. No 
difference in substantive findings arose from these 
manipulations. OLS results are presented in the 
text because the two-stage procedure provides 
slightly different parameter estimates depending 
on the first-stage range selected, and there is no 
rationale to guide a particular choice. Alternate 
methods such as probit and logit analysis are 
computationally cumbersome and unlikely to pro- 
duce different results, given the stability of 
findings under the two-stage procedure. 
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Table 3. Regressions of Social Control Response Items on Severity, City Size, Region and Time Period 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficient a 
Dependent Variable b 
(1) (2) 
Independent Variable Called State Police Called National Guard 
Constant .949* * (5.44) .134 (0.95) 
Severity ? .042** (6.33) .063** (11.80) 
City Size (log) - .071** (-4.94) -.014 (- 1.17) 
South -.013 (-0.28) .227** (5.61) 
t2 e .118 (1.74) -.062 (-1.11) 
tat (Post-Martin Luther 
King-Assassination period -.016 (-0.33) .104** (2.62) 
tug -.065 (-0.97) -.061 (-1.12) 
ta -.041 (-0.61) -.005 (-0.08) 
R2 .17 .37 
No. of observations 300 300 
* Significant at p < .05. 
** Significant at p < .01. 
a t-values are shown in parentheses. 
Dependent variable coded 1 if social control agent was called, 0 otherwise. 
e Scale values are coded 0, 1, 4, 12. 
d Coded 1 if southern city, 0 otherwise. 
" Dummy term coded 1 if disorder occurred during August 1967-March, 1968, and coded zero 
otherwise. Deleted term is for January-July, 1967. 
'Dummy term for April, 1968. 
g Dummy term for May-July, 1968. 
h Dummy term for August-December, 1968. 
lice." The significant negative coefficient 
for city size indicates that, holding severity 
constant, large cities were, indeed, less 
likely to obtain assistance from the state 
police than were small communities. Use 
of the item "called state police" to define 
a severity level would therefore make small 
communities appear to have had more seri- 
ous outbursts, and large cities less serious 
disorders, than is suggested by descriptive 
information on the amount of violence and 
by quantitative data on crowd size, num- 
ber of arrests and number of injuries. 
In the National Guard equation (column 
2), the significant coefficient corresponding 
to the post-Martin Luther King-assassina- 
tion period indicates that inclusion of this 
organizational response item in a severity 
scale would make the disturbances follow- 
ing the murder appear more turbulent han 
is warranted on the basis of our severity 
index. This finding supports the anticipa- 
tory deployment contention. With respect 
to the term for South, its significance in 
the regression suggests that, holding the 
extent of violence and other factors con- 
stant, a southern state was more likely 
than a northern one to provide this manner 
of law enforcement assistance to locales 
contending with hostile outbursts. In sum- 
mary, we find that the social control items 
contained in Wanderer's everity scale are 
intimately related to other community char- 
acteristics. If used to measure severity, 
they will provide an inaccurate description 
of the amount of violence and destruction 
that actually transpired. 
Reinforcement Effects and Time Trend 
The variables in this study which bear 
the greatest sociological significance are 
ones which refer to structural and demo- 
graphic features of a community. The find- 
ings with respect to these factors can in- 
form us about how the severity of hostile 
outbursts is conditioned by the way our 
cities are organized and governed and by 
the pervasiveness of the deprivations to 
which Negro residents are subjected. Most 
of the community characteristics that we 
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shall examine change only slowly during a 
brief time interval, such as the period cov- 
ered by this study (1967-68); therefore, 
we will treat them as constant in time and 
employ cross-sectional procedures. What 
we shall be investigating, then, is the pres- 
ence of a severity value that is community 
specific and relatively stable over time; 
both properties deriving from its conceptu- 
alization as a function of community 
demography and social organization. 
Before addressing this issue, we discuss 
some volatile aspects of a community's 
severity value. This matter is of importance 
because we wish to acquire a compre- 
hensive understanding of the determinants 
of severity and, also, because controls will 
be necessary for the responsible factors 
in order to obtain unbiased estimates of 
the community effects. One possible source 
of volatility relates to the presence of mul- 
tiple disturbances in a city during the two- 
year interval; often they were at different 
levels of severity. While this may be simply 
a consequence of random variation about 
a community's "characteristic value," it 
also could reflect the influence of sys- 
tematic factors. In particular, as we sug- 
gested in the introduction, a reinforcement 
process might operate whereby an outbreak 
of violence alters the expected severity of 
a subsequent disorder in the same city. 
This would happen, for instance, if the 
police were to increase their preparation in 
riot control procedures following an initial 
outburst (thereby lowering the expected 
severity of later disorders), or if insensitive 
police actions during the first incident were 
to leave a residue of bitterness and hostility 
in the black community (in which case 
the intensity of subsequent violence might 
be raised). In either case, the expected 
severity of a disturbance would be a func- 
tion of the history of prior racial turmoil 
in the city. A second potential source of 
volatility relates to the presence of a time 
trend. Outbreaks of exceptionally severe 
disorders following the assassination of 
Martin Luther King would constitute an 
example of such temporal variation. 
Evidence for both contentions can be 
found in Table 4. The entries in column 
(1) report mean severity rank by time 
period 13 for the first disturbance in a 
community; in column (2) analogous fig- 
ures are presented for disturbances subse- 
quent to the first one. These values sug- 
gest that disorder severity was a relatively 
13 The time periods were specified with two 
considerations in mind: to place roughly equal 
numbers of cities in each interval and to group 
disorders in a way that would heighten the im- 
pact of substantive events. T1 reflects primarily, 
the many incidents which followed the major 
Newark disorder; t2 is a residual category; t8 
contains the post-Martin Luther King-assassina- 
tion disorders; t4 and t5 divide the summer of 
1968 disturbances. The latter two periods are 
presented separately because of the different 
effect each has in the regression models (Table 
5). 
Table 4. Disorder Severity by Ordinal Position of the Disturbance in a City and by Time Period, 
1967-68 
Subsequent Disturbances 
First Disturbance in City" in City 
(1) (2) 
Mean Number of Mean Number of 
Period Severity b Disorders Severity b Disorders 
Jan.-July, 1967 (t1) .782 78 .913 46 
Aug., 1967-March, 1968 (t2) .750 16 .825 20 
April, 1968 (ta) c .510 51 1.270 37 
May-July, 1968 (t4) 1.000 13 .789 26 
Aug.-Dec., 1968 (t5) .923 13 .659 22 
N 171 151 
a Includes only cities for which a first disorder occurred in 1967-1968. 
bUntransformed scale values (0-3) were used to reduce the effect of very high severity scores. 
The pattern of results is unchanged but the effects more pronounced if transformed severity values (0-12) are used. 
e Post-Martin Luther King-assassination period. 
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stable phenomenon until the assassination 
of Martin Luther King. In the weeks fol- 
lowing his murder, the severity of a first 
disorder in a city declined, while com- 
munities with a history of racial turmoil 
incurred a marked increase in intensity of 
violence. A reversal of this pattern is 
apparent in the final time periods: first 
disorders exhibit a severity increase while 
later outbreaks in a city show a decline. 
Although these effects are striking and 
suggest the operation of both a time trend 
and different influences upon first and 
later disorders in a city, the responsible 
mechanisms are not discernible from an in- 
spection of Table 4. In order to unravel the 
determinants of the volatility in disorder 
severity, we resort to a regression formula- 
tion in which the processes outlined above 
are taken into account, and controls are 
also incorporated for community differ- 
ences in disorder-proneness. Controls for 
the latter factor are necessary because 
cities with different characteristic severity 
values may differ as well in their proneness 
to incur disturbances, and this feature may 
be confounded with the aforementioned 
processes. In particular, communities with 
high severity potentials might tend to ex- 
perience many disorders and therefore 
would probably undergo a first disturbance 
in an early time period. This situation 
would produce a spurious time trend un- 
less the determinants of disorder-proneness 
are explicitly controlled. 
The dependent variable in the regression 
was disorder severity, while the indepen- 
dent variables were dummy terms for time 
period, number of prior disorders in the 
city and South, plus a continuous term 
for nonwhite population size. The latter 
two variables were included because they 
have been cited as major determinants of 
community disorder-proneness (Spilerman, 
1970b). One further point regarding model 
specification deserves comment. Many 
American cities incurred multiple disturb- 
ances during 1967-68. Since each of the 
incidents constitutes an observation in our 
analysis, there is a possibility that the resid- 
uals from the regression will be serially 
correlated. This would occur, for example, 
if certain community characteristics that 
are determinants of severity were omitted 
from the regression equation. The error 
terms for the disorders in a particular city 
would tend, then, to be either all high or 
all low, depending on the effect of the 
Table 5. Regressions of Disorder Severity a on Time Period, Number of Prior Disturbances, Non- 
white Population Size and Region 
Independent Unstandardized Regression Coefficient' 
Variable (1) (2) 
Constant -6.698** (-5.09) -6.772** (4.85) 
ta .033 (0.05) .019 (0.03) 
tat .967* (2.21) .971* (2.20) 
1.034 (1.76) .928 (1.60) 
t5 .311 (0.51) .384 (0.62) 
1 Prior Disorderd -.275 (-0.60) 
2 Prior Disordersd -1.668** (-2.64) 
3+ Prior Disordersd _2.657** (-4.05) 
Number of Prior Disorders' ..445** (-3.74) 
Nonwhite Population 
Size (log) .892** (6.25) .890** (6.16) 
South - 1. 146** (-2.63) 1. 154** (-2.62) 
R2 .149 .134 
No. of observations 300 300 
* Significant at p <.05. 
** Significant at p <.01. 
Scale values of severity are coded 0, 1, 4, 12. 
b t-values are in parentheses. 
e Post-Martin Luther King-assassination period; see Table 4 for exact specification of the time 
period terms. Deleted term is tG. 
d During 1961-68. 
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omitted factor. In either case the residuals 
would be correlated, and this will invali- 
date tests of hypotheses with respect to the 
regression coefficients (Kmenta, 1971: 
281). However, an examination of the 
residuals (Appendix I) failed to reveal 
autocorrelated errors, and ordinary least 
squares was used. 
The results reported in Table 5 provide 
evidence for each of the preceding con- 
tentions regarding the determinants of 
volatility in disorder severity. With respect 
to a temporal trend, the entries in column 
(1) reveal that the post-Martin Luther 
King-assassination disturbances in April, 
1968, were unusually severe, net of the 
other variables in the equation. On our 
12-unit scale, a disturbance at that point 
in time tended to be approximately one 
unit more severe than one in the refer- 
ence interval (ti). This effect appears to 
have spilled over into the early summer 
months of 1968; although owing, possibly, 
to the few incidents in that period, the co- 
efficient for t4 is not statistically significant. 
The two community characteristics that 
were included in the regression because of 
their known influence on disorder fre- 
quency (nonwhite population size and a 
dummy term for South) have effects on 
severity which are identical to the ones re- 
ported for them in the disorder-proneness 
study (Spilerman, 1970b: 643). Both se- 
verity and frequency vary directly with 
nonwhite population size (a large popula- 
tion provides the human resources for 
many disturbances and for severe ones). 
Also, severity and frequency both were 
substantially lower in the South; according 
to the specification of equation (1), the 
average severity of a disturbance in this 
region was more than one scale unit below 
that of a non-southern incident, net of the 
other factors. In the disorder-proneness 
study, we speculated that the regional 
difference might reflect lower expectations 
on the part of southern Negroes regarding 
the likely rate of improvement in their 
conditions (and, hence, less frustration 
from observing the actual rate of progress) 
and a greater fear of repression and retri- 
bution. This same explanation would ac- 
count for disorders being less severe in 
the South since the salient point, again, 
is that there would be fewer potential riot 
participants in cities in this region. 
Perhaps the most intriguing finding con- 
cerns the contribution from prior out- 
breaks. With the occurrence of each inci- 
dent, the expected severity of a subsequent 
disorder in the same city declined. It is 
noteworthy that the contribution from one 
prior outbreak is not as large as the 
marginal contribution from two, or from 
three or more, prior outbreaks. I interpret 
this to mean that participant exhaustion 
may have had more to do with the decline 
in severity than did improved police 
preparation in response to previous racial 
turmoil in the city. Under the latter process, 
a first incident should have had the larg- 
est effect, with additional police training 
and preparation stimulated by subsequent 
disorders making progressively smaller 
marginal contributions to the reduction in 
severity. However, the regression results 
reveal the reverse pattern, one that is more 
understandable in terms of an explanation 
which emphasizes cumulative exhaustion 
and growing disinterest on the part of po- 
tential participants to engaging in yet an- 
other disturbance. This interpretation is 
highly speculative, of course; presumably 
both processes operated in varying degrees, 
and a more detailed analysis than we are 
prepared to undertake here would be 
necessary to disentangle their separate ef- 
fects. Nevertheless, irrespective of which 
interpretation one prefers, the empirical 
finding is quite clear: severity declined as 
a function of the number of prior out- 
breaks in a city. This is a very important 
point because other investigators (Downes, 
1968; 1970; Morgan and Clark, 1973) 
have chosen to characterize each city by 
a single severity value corresponding to its 
most severe incident.14 
14The procedure which Downes followed in 
assigning severity values to cities is not evident 
from his articles. It was clarified in an exchange 
of letters with the author. We point out that de- 
spite the tendency to lower severity with each 
additional disorder, this assignment would associ- 
ate high severity values with high multiple dis- 
order cities. A city with many incidents simply 
has had more opportunity to incur a severe 
disturbance. 
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Because of the tendency of the dummy 
terms for each higher number of prior 
disorders to show effects which decrease 
in an almost linear fashion, we can replace 
them by a single variable, the number of 
prior outbreaks in a city. The coefficients 
for this more concise model are presented 
in column (2) of Table 5 and differ only 
in minor ways from the parameters of 
the preceding equation. These variables 
will be the controls in our investigation 
of the impact of community structure and 
demography on disorder severity. Before 
undertaking that analysis, we turn to the 
question of the robustness of the regression 
results. 
Sensitivity analysis. While we believe 
that the severity measure accurately depicts 
the magnitude of violence and destruction 
that transpired in particular disorders, it 
is nonetheless true that other researchers, 
employing alternative methods to assess 
severity, might have constructed different 
indices. It behooves us, therefore, to as- 
certain whether the results we have re- 
ported are an artifact of the particular 
coding scheme that was used or whether 
they are robust with regard to specification 
of the severity index. We address this issue 
in the present section. 
One potential source of error relates to 
our assignment of interval scores to the 
rank differences. In order to ascertain the 
sensitivity of the findings to the particular 
values that were selected, the analysis 
summarized in Table 5 was repeated with 
alternate specifications of the rank differ- 
ehces. These results are presented in the 
form of standardized regression coefficients 
in columns (1) through (3) of Table 6.15 
Standardized coefficients are reported be- 
cause they are more suitable for compari- 
sons which involve different dependent 
variables than are unstandardized coeffi- 
cients; the magnitude of the latter will 
vary with the choice of metric for the de- 
pendent variable. 
With respect to number of prior dis- 
orders, nonwhite population size and 
South, the results appear not to be sensitive 
to the precise specification of the severity 
measure. In regard to these variables, our 
conclusions would not be changed if a 
moderately different severity index were 
substituted for ours. The results for the 
time period effects, however, do display 
sensitivity to the values assigned to the 
rank differences. In particular, if severity 
were measured on the 0-3 scale we would 
conclude that the post-Martin Luther King- 
assassination disorders were not especially 
violent, while if it were measured on the 
0-25 scale we would envision the events 
of this period as significantly more violent 
than we have reported with the 0-12 
scale. While we believe that our instru- 
ment provides a more accurate representa- 
tion of the severity levels than either of 
the alternatives, the time period effects 
should be seen as less well established than 
the other findings. 
A second potential source of error re- 
lates to classification of the individual dis- 
turbances into severity categories, a task 
which was performed in accordance with 
the criteria described in Table 1. For a 
portion of the incidents we have available 
quantitative information on facets of se- 
verity-crowd size, number of arrests, 
number of injuries-and were able to repli- 
cate the analysis using these components 
as dependent variables. The results are 
presented in columns (4) through (6) of 
Table 5 and are consistent with the find- 
ings obtained with our composite index. 
Number of prior disturbances and the two 
determinants of disorder-proneness (non- 
white population size and South) show 
effects that are very similar to the ones 
already reported for them. With respect to 
the time period terms, t3 is significant in 
two of the three equations and t4 is sig- 
nificant in one equation. This provides sup- 
porting evidence for the contention that the 
post-assassination disorders were more se- 
vere than incidents in the other time peri- 
ods. It should also be noted that the fact 
15 The regression coefficients in column (1) 
correspond to an assignment of the values 0, 1, 
2, 3 to the dependent variable. In column (2), 
the scale values are the ones which were used 
in our composite severity index so the entries 
here are beta coefficients for the second model 
in Table 5. In column (3), the values 0, 1, 6, 25 
were assigned to the severity ranks. 
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that these results parallel the ones obtained 
with the composite index means that the 
unidimensional conceptualization of sever- 
ity is not obscuring relationships between 
components of this construct and the other 
factors. 
Finally, a canonical correlation model 
was estimated taking as observations those 
disturbances for which we have data on all 
three severity components. The substantive 
perspective underlying use of this model 
here involves viewing severity as an un- 
observed construct for which we have avail- 
able three indicators: crowd size, number 
of arrests and number of injuries. This 
formulation therefore utilizes information 
on the three severity facets simultaneously 
in forming the "dependent variable." 16 
It is unlike our composite measure in that 
the weights assigned to the components 
combine them in a linear fashion, in that 
the weights are estimated by making use 
of their relationships to the "independent 
variables," and in that non-quantitative in- 
formation on the incidents is not utilized. 
Despite these differences the coefficients of 
the independent variables in the canonical 
model are quite consistent with the pre- 
ceding findings.17 Although we lack signifi- 
cance tests for the individual variates, they 
are similar in sign and in magnitude to the 
coefficients obtained with the other formu- 
lations. We conclude that the results re- 
ported in Table 5 are not idiosyncratic of 
the severity index which was used. Under 
an assortment of alternative specifications 
of severity and under different analytic 
procedures the same substantive assessment 
would have been reached. 
Community-Based Deprivations and 
Disorder Severity 
In the introductory section, we presented 
a rationale for investigating the impact of 
Negro living conditions in a community 
on the severity of its disorders. We indi- 
cated that while the kinds of discontent 
which derive from community-based de- 
privations have not been found to be 
related to the frequency of hostile out- 
bursts, there are theoretical considerations 
and results from other empirical studies 
(Wanderer, 1968; Downes, 1968; 1970; 
Morgan and Clark, 1973) which suggest 
that this may not be the case with disorder 
severity; that once a disturbance has be- 
gun, the frustrations which have accumu- 
lated among Negroes as a result of their 
circumstance in the community may well 
be expressed in the intensity of the aggres- 
sion. 
To the extent that the frustrations which 
provoked Negroes to riot during the 1960s 
were a consequence of local deprivations, 
we would expect the variation across cities 
in disorder severity to correspond to the 
variation in the indicators of the relevant 
deprivations, once other salient factors 
have been controlled. This raises the ques- 
tion of which conditions were responsible 
for the discontent expressed in the rioting. 
The presence of city differences in im- 
portant determinants of Negro well-being 
is not a sufficient reason for concluding 
that a corresponding variation will exist 
in the frustration level of inhabitants in 
different ghettos. Many potential sources 
of discontent are only that-potential 
sources-until attention is called to them 
and they are invested with symbolic im- 
port and racial significance. (Examples are 
Negro-white disparities in various social 
areas, which form a basis for reference 
group explanations of frustration.) There 
are other community characteristics whose 
values in different cities are likely to in- 
duce corresponding variations in the level 
of discontent, irrespective of whether or 
not they become foci of attention. For 
instance, there probably is greater discon- 
tent where median Negro income is low 
than where it is high, because of the 
16 The canonical model does not distinguish 
between "dependent" and "independent" variables 
and simply forms the linear combinations in the 
two sets of variables which maximizes the cor- 
relation between them. For details on the pro- 
cedure, see Van de.Geer (1971, ch. 14). For the 
purpose of clarity in our substantive argument, 
we retained the traditional labels. 
17 The canonical weights assigned to the 
severity components (dependent variables) were 
.68, .20 and .27, corresponding to crowd size, log 
(arrests) and log (injuries). Because of the 
greater importance of crowd size in the linear 
combination, the entries in column (7) of Table 
6 were rescaled with reference to that equation. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.62.83 on Fri, 12 Jul 2013 15:54:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
784 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 
enormous importance of this factor for 
access to a variety of institutions and de- 
sirable life styles. However, this does not 
mean that the greater frustration in poor 
ghettos necessarily will be articulated in 
severity of rioting; the disorders of the 
1960s may have been reactions to entirely 
different provocations than community 
conditions. 
Because we are not prepared to assert 
which inequities were especially galling to 
Negroes or whether they were oriented in 
this period to a particular reference group, 
our strategy will be to postulate a number 
of plausible ways by which frustration may 
derive from community conditions and then 
ascertain the relation between measures of 
the relevant factors and disorder severity. 
A detailed discussion of this procedure 
has been presented elsewhere (Spilerman, 
1970b:639-41); consequently, the argu- 
ment only is summarized here and the 
reader is referred to the earlier report for 
details. In essence, we have selected com- 
munity characteristics which can serve as 
indicators for a social disorganization ex- 
planation, for reference group explana- 
tions and for a thesis which associates the 
severity of rioting with an unresponsive 
municipal political structure. 
Social disorganization. According to this 
perspective on the causes of collective 
aggression, individuals who are weakly 
integrated into their community, in the 
sense of having few associational ties or 
little personal identification with it, are 
less encumbered by the constraints which 
would dissuade others from participating 
in a destructive outburst. One formulation 
of this thesis refers to the disorienting 
effects of rapid population change. A lo- 
cale which has experienced a substantial 
influx of new residents would have ac- 
quired many persons who are unacquainted 
with the institutionalized procedures for 
seeking redress of grievances; at the same 
time, these individuals would have little 
investment in solving problems in a manner 
which avoids rancor and conflict in the 
community (Coleman, 1957:20-1). Frus- 
tration is not the animus here; rather, it 
is the absence of social links which nor- 
mally permit informal control to be exer- 
cised and prevent disputes from polarizing 
and degenerating into hostility and vio- 
lence. A second version of the social dis- 
organization thesis stresses the negative as- 
sociation with community that is likely to 
characterize the attitudes of residents in 
the worst ghettos because of their continual 
exposure to crime, filth and dilapidated 
housing. As indicators of the first formula- 
tion, we used the census variables percent 
change in total population and percent 
change in nonwhite population.18 As in- 
dicators of the second formulation, we 
employed the variables percent of non- 
whites residing in dwellings constructed be- 
fore 1950 and percent of nonwhites living 
in housing with substandard plumbing. 
Political structure. During periods of 
rapid change in the status of a minority, 
such as occurred for Negroes during the 
1960s, issues frequently arise which re- 
quire the representation of its views in the 
municipal government. Also, if bitter dis- 
putes involving the group are to be re- 
solved without confrontation and violence, 
there is a need for city officials to be 
oriented toward compromise and accom- 
modation. While we lack performance 
measures on how racial disputes were 
processed in the many cities which experi- 
enced disorders during 1967-68, there is 
evidence that certain electoral procedures 
and political structures make for greater 
responsiveness to the sensitivities of di- 
verse constituents, and we have measures 
of the presence of these arrangements. In 
particular, Lieberson and Silverman 
',"Although we are examining events which 
occurred during 1967-68, the community char- 
acteristics were drawn largely from the 1960 
Census of Population. Despite the fact that 1970 
census data are a couple of years closer in time 
to the disturbances, the earlier census year is 
preferable because our hypotheses refer to the 
impact of conditions which have been in exist- 
ence for some period of time. It is also the case 
that most of the community variables are stable 
in the sense that the correlation over cities be- 
tween their 1960 and 1970 values is high. In a 
few instances, this is not the case; percentage 
change in total population, percentage change 
in nonwhite population, and the unemployment 
rates for the racial groups can be very different 
in successive census years. In these instances, 
both the 1960 and 1970 values of the variables 
were used in the analysis. 
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(1965) and Wilson (1960:25-7) have 
argued that a municipal government will 
be more representative of community com- 
position when council members are elected 
from established districts, rather than at- 
large, and when the council districts are 
small; the rationale being that opportunity 
is thereby increased for a numerically 
small but geographically concentrated 
group to elect its own members. It has also 
been suggested (Coleman, 1957:14-6; Al- 
ford and Scoble, 1965) that a mayor- 
council structure and partisan elections 
will enhance governmental responsiveness 
to the diverse and conflicting interests of 
a socially heterogeneous community. In 
our analysis we included dummy variables 
for presence of nonpartisan elections and 
for mayor-council government and con- 
tinuous variables for population per 
councilman and proportion of the city 
council elected at-large. 
Deprivation explanations. These ap- 
proaches to explaining frustration may be 
classified according to whether or not the 
presence of a reference group is postulated. 
A bsolute deprivation explanations attrib- 
ute the inter-city variation in level of Negro 
discontent to community differences in 
social and economic opportunity for ghetto 
residents. The presumption here is that 
where many persons earn low incomes or 
are employed at unsatisfying tasks, discon- 
tent will be more widespread. Since it fo- 
cuses upon the economically most disad- 
vantaged population segment in a com- 
munity, this is an instance of an underclass 
explanation of the sources of violence and 
aggression (Downes, 1968:513-4). As in- 
dicators of the level of absolute depriva- 
tion of Negroes, the following variables 
were used: percent of nonwhite males em- 
ployed in low status occupations (house- 
hold workers, service workers, laborers); 
the nonwhite male unemployment rate; 
nonwhite median family income; and non- 
white median education. 
Relative deprivation explanations posit 
the existence of a reference group or an 
objective standard against which individu- 
als compare their status or their progress. 
The level of frustration for the under- 
privileged is usually specified as a func- 
tion of the size of the gap between the 
two populations on relevant variables. One 
possible reference group for Negroes would 
be whites in the same community. To 
measure Negro circumstance relative to 
this group, the absolute deprivation indi- 
cators were divided by comparable indices 
of white living standards. Alternatively, in 
a highly segregated society such as ours, 
Negroes may have more familiarity with 
the stylized version of white family life 
which is depicted in situation shows on 
television and may compare their own 
circumstances to this portrayal. In the dis- 
order-proneness tudy (Spilerman, 1970b: 
640), it was argued that the indicators 
of absolute deprivation provide the ap- 
propriate measures for this relative depri- 
vation thesis. Finally, these same com- 
munity characteristics may be associated 
with yet additional explanations, which 
argue an expectational or a competition 
thesis.19 While such complexities are dis- 
cussed in the preceding report (Spiler- 
man, 1970b:639-41), they are not elabo- 
rated upon here since the empirical results 
will not require ascertaining which of these 
explanations is to be given greatest cre- 
dence. 
Significance of the community charac- 
teristics. In order to ascertain whether 
disorders tended to be more severe where 
the objective measures of Negro circum- 
stance in a community indicate greater 
disadvantage, it is necessary to include in 
the analysis other major determinants of 
severity that are correlated with the com- 
munity factors of interest (Blalock, 1964: 
48). Controls were introduced for the 
variables listed in Table 5 (second model). 
The importance of adjusting for these ef- 
fects can be motivated in the following 
19 With regard to the latter theme, Lieberson 
and Silverman (1965) suggest that racial violence 
may be more common where Negro and white 
males earn proximate incomes, occupy similar 
occupational statuses and, generally, are inter- 
changeable in the social and economic life of the 
community. According to this explanation, small 
racial disparities would be associated with a high 
level of tension. For convenience, the percent 
nonwhite variable, which also has been inter- 
preted as an indicator of interracial competition 
(Blalock, 1957), is included in this cluster (Table 
7). 
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Table 7. Correlations between Disorder Severity and Aspects of Community Structure' 
(2) 
Partial Correlation, 
(1) Controlling for Region, 
Zero-Order Nonwhite Population, 
Correlation Temporal Effects and 
with Disorder Number of 
Community Attribute Severityb Previous Disturbances' 
Region and Nonwhite Population Sized 
South (Dummy) -.062 -.151 h 
Nonwhite Population (log x) .270* .339* *h 
Indicators of Social Disorganization' 
Percent Change in Total Population, 1950-60 -.093 -.016 
Percent Change in Total Population, 1960-70 -.053 .008 
Percent Change in Nonwhite Population, 1950-60 .048 .099 
Percent Change in Nonwhite Population, 1960-70 .001 .035 
Percent of Nonwhites Living in Housing Built 
before 1950 .083 -.014 
Percent of Nonwhites Living in Housing with 
Substandard Plumbing .130* .018 
Indicators of Absolute Deprivation' 
Percent of Nonwhite Males Employed in 
Traditionally Negro OccupationsI -.139* -.084 
Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate, 1960 .068 .044 
Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate, 1970 .047 .027 
Nonwhite Median Family Income .060 .034 
Nonwhite Median Education .021 -.065 
Indicators of Relative Deprivation' 
Percent of Nonwhite Males Employed in 
Traditionally Negro Occupations Divided 
by White Figure -.105 -.049 
Nonwhite Median Family Income Divided by 
White Income .074 .063 
Nonwhite Unemployment Rate Divided by 
White Rate, 1960 .028 .031 
Nonwhite Unemployment Rate Divided by 
White Rate, 1970 -.016 .012 
Nonwhite Median Education Divided by 
White Education .109* .005 
Percent Nonwhite I (A/x) . 148** .033 
Indicators of Political Structure 
Population per Councilman .175** -.019 
Percent of City Council Elected At-Large -.089 -.040 
Presence of Nonpartisan Elections - .066 -.022 
Presence of Mayor-Council Gov't. .110* .018 
* Significant at p <.05. 
** Significant at p<.01. 
a Number of observations equals 300. 
b Disorder Severity coded (0-12). 
c Control variables specified by equation (2) of Table 5. A separate regression was run for each 
community characteristic, containing it and the controls. 
'Source: U. S. Census of Population (1963; 1973). 
o Source: Municipal Yearbook (1965). 
Service workers + household workers + laborers. 
'See footnote 19 regarding inclusion of this variable with the indicators of relative deprivation. 
h Controls are for other variables in equation (2) of Table 5. 
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way: because of the Negro revolt character 
of the disturbances in the 1960s, the term 
for Negro population size measures the 
availability of participants for large (and 
severe) disorders; holding this variable 
constant allows us to compare communi- 
ties having different sized pools of potential 
participants. The term for South permits 
an additive regional adjustment in the re- 
lationship between the community vari- 
ables and disorder severity; it is introduced 
in recognition of the very different cultural 
traditions of the geographic regions in race 
relations.20 (We already have seen that the 
regional effect is to depress severity in 
the South.) In an analogous fashion, the 
controls for number of previous disturb- 
ances and for time period adjust for any 
obscuring effects arising from these vola- 
tile determinants of disorder severity. 
In Table 7 we report zero-order correla- 
tions between each of the community char- 
acteristics and disorder severity (column 
1) and partial correlations (column 2) 
controlling for the variables in Table 5. 
(The latter entries derive from 21 regres- 
sions, each containing the controls and 
a single deprivation indicator.) We see that 
while there are several significant zero- 
order effects, none remains significant once 
the control variables are entered into the 
equation. Again, these results are not an 
artifact of the particular interval values that 
were assigned to the severity ranks or of 
the manner in which the disturbances were 
categorized. The analysis was replicated 
taking as dependent variables the two al- 
ternate interval assignments (see Table 6) 
and the three quantitative components of 
severity (crowd size, number of arrests, 
number of injuries). This exercise pro- 
duced results that are virtually identical 
with the ones reported here.21 
Another approach to evaluating the im- 
portance of the explanations which associ- 
ate disorder severity with Negro depriva- 
tion in a community is to assess the joint 
contribution from each cluster of variables 
toward accounting for the unexplained 
variation in the dependent variable. The 
terms in each cluster listed in Table 7 
20We emphasize that the two variables, non- 
white population size and South, were introduced 
into the investigation of volatility in disorder 
severity for a different reason than they are 
entered here. Formerly, they served as controls 
for community disorder-proneness. Had other 
variables been found to be determinants of dis- 
order-proneness, nonwhite population size and 
South would still be added at this point for the 
reasons cited in the text. 
21 In the five replications, there were two in- 
stances in which a community characteristic re- 
mained significant in the presence of the controls. 
Percent change in nonwhite population was sig- 
nificant when severity was coded 0-3; nonwhite 
median education was significant in the log 
(arrests) equation. Because significance in each 
case was barely attained at the level p < .05 and 
because there was no corroborating evidence 
from other variables in a cluster, these results 
are discounted in the discussion. In no instance 
was an entire cluster significant as judged by an 
F-test on the added R2. 
Table 8. Percent of Variance in Disorder Severity Accounted for by Different Variable Clusters 
(2) (3) 
Percent of Percent of 
Total Variance Total Variance 
(1) Explained by Explained by 
Percent of Nonwhite Cluster When 
Total Variance Population Entered after 
Explained When Entered Nonwhite 
by Cluster after Cluster Population and 
Variable Cluster a and Controls b and Controlsb Other Controlsb 
Nonwhite Population C 13.4 - - 
Social Disorganization 6.0 9.5 1.8 
Absolute Deprivation 4.2 10.6 1.4 
Relative Deprivation 6.7 7.5 .8 
Political Structure 6.4 7.2 .2 
a See Table 7 for a description of the variables included in each cluster. 
b In this table "controls" refer to all variables in Table 5, column 2, except nonwhite population. 
This cluster refers to the equation of Table 5, column 2. 
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were therefore entered into a regression 
equation containing the controls. These 
results are reported in Table 8. In no in- 
stance does a cluster add as much as two 
percentage points of explained variation 
to the 13.4 percent accounted for by the 
control variables (column 3); also, in 
every case, the added R2 is insignificant at 
the .10 level, as judged by a conventional 
F-test. 
We stress that this result is not a con- 
sequence of the deprivation indicators and 
nonwhite population size sharing the same 
variation.22 In no case does the signifi- 
cance of the population term in a regres- 
sion fail to reach the .01 level in the pres- 
ence of either a single deprivation measure 
or a variable cluster. Indeed, while none 
of the clusters, entered after the controls, 
increased the R2 by as much as two per- 
centage points (over the initial 13.4 
points), the nonwhite population term 
alone, entered after the other controls and 
any cluster of deprivation indicators, adds 
a minimum of 7.2 percentage points to the 
explained variation (column 2) .23 
Our analysis therefore indicates that in 
the period of the 1960s, the severity of a 
disturbance had little basis in community 
organization or economic structure. Hold- 
ing constant a measure of the size of the 
pool.of potential participants and several 
determinants of the volatility in severity, 
it is not the case that an outbreak of racial 
violence tended to be more severe where 
Negro status is low (in absolute terms or 
relative to one of several reference 
groups), where community disorganization 
is extensive, or where the structure of the 
municipal government suggests it would be 
unresponsive to the interests of Negro con- 
stituents.24 Instead, as we have reported 
with respect to the determinants of dis- 
order-proneness (Spilerman, 1970b; 1971), 
the only stable community characteristics 
that are related to severity are nonwhite 
population size and a contextual term for 
South. 
These results are at variance with the 
findings by Morgan and Clark (1973) who 
argue that disorder severity in the mid- 
1 960s was a function of the grievance 
level of Negroes in a community. In par- 
ticular, they report that severity was raised 
22 Only one of the 21 zero-order correlations 
between log (nonwhite population) and a de- 
privation indicator exceeds .5 in magnitude: 
r(log[nonwhite population], population/council- 
man) = .78. 
23 In addition to the additive regressions re- 
ported in the text, we examined several inter- 
action models to ascertain whether unusually 
severe disturbances tended to occur where there 
is both high deprivation and a large Negro popu- 
lation. In one formulation, log(nonwhite popula- 
tion) was added to an equation containing the 
other controls listed in Table 5 (equation 2) 
and the interaction term Dep x log(nonwhite 
population), where Dep represents a deprivation 
measure listed in Table 7. In every instance (21 
equations), the interaction term dropped to in- 
significance (p > .05), while the population 
variable was significant at the .01 level. In a 
second formulation, the two variables Dep and 
Dep x log(nonwhite population) were added to 
an equation containing the controls. As judged 
by an F-test on the added R2, in all but one 
instance these terms were insignificant at the .05 
level. The sole case of a significant interaction 
involved the variable low nonwhite occupational 
status. Since the sign of this interaction was nega- 
tive (counter to the postulated thesis) and since 
the other indicators of absolute deprivation were 
insignificant, we discount this finding. The inter- 
action results were invariant across the three 
interval-level specifications of the dependent vari- 
able. 
24 A parallel analysis also was carried out with 
a few variables which tap police organization and 
training. Although we lacked detailed data on 
police preparation in riot control tactics in the 
various cities, information on a few police 
characteristics is reported in the Municipal Year- 
book (1966). A presence/absence code was con- 
structed for the following factors: existence of a 
special riot control unit; existence of a prepared 
plan for riot control; and use of dogs in riot 
control. 
When these variables were entered subsequent 
to the controls, all were found to be statistically 
insignificant. (This finding is consistent with our 
suggestion that improved police preparation as 
a result of a disturbance may have had less to do 
with the severity decline than did participant 
exhaustion or lessened interest in further riot- 
ing.) Yet, the notion that police tactics and 
training have little impact on how quickly a dis- 
order is contained is difficult to accept. Because 
our indicators are few in number and not par- 
ticularly sensitive to the quality of police prepara- 
tion, because they relate to police organization 
in the early 1 960s before disorder control be- 
came a major issue, and because our primary 
interest here concerns the relation between sev- 
erity and objective measures of Negro frustration 
in a community, these results are mentioned only 
en passant. 
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by racial inequality in housing conditions, 
but depressed by inequality in occupa- 
tional status. We find their analysis less 
than persuasive25 for the following rea- 
sons. (1) Their assertions are based on 
only 23 observations. This is a small sam- 
ple, particularly for establishing a counter- 
intuitive result such as the occupational 
effect. (2) They confounded disturbances 
of very different types. Although their ex- 
planatory variables were justified as indi- 
cators of Negro grievances in a community, 
the disorders they analyzed include inci- 
dents in which the aggression was perpe- 
trated by whites, as well as instances of 
Negro aggression (Morgan and Clark, 
1973:612). It is unclear, however, what 
the rationale is for analyzing the severity 
of white-instigated violence in terms of 
Negro grievances; at a minimum, the rela- 
tionship with severity would not be the 
same for the two types of disorders so 
they should not have been mixed. (3) 
Morgan and Clark failed to include proper 
controls for the size of the potential par- 
ticipant pool, which is necessary to ascer- 
tain the contribution from the grievance 
indicators net of city differences in available 
manpower for mounting a severe disturb- 
ance. They did incorporate a term for city 
size26 but this is not the correct control for 
potential participants. Where rioting is prin- 
cipally by Negroes, adjustment should be 
made for the size of this population group 
(or its relevant age cohort); where the ag- 
gression is by whites, the size of that group 
should be controlled. 
Conclusions 
We have sought in this investigation to 
ascertain whether certain structural ar- 
rangements or demographic features of a 
community were responsible for especially 
severe disturbances during the 1960s. In 
previous studies (Spilerman, 1970b; 1971), 
we reported that the disturbance locations 
were unrelated to a number of objective 
indicators of Negro well-being in a lo- 
cale. As a result, it was suggested that 
explanations of the causes of the riots must 
be sought in frustrations which carried 
nationwide salience, and the areal distribu- 
tion of the incidents should be understood 
in terms of mechanisms which promoted 
geographic diffuseness in the impact of 
provocations. Our findings with respect to 
the determinants of disorder severity un- 
derscore that assessment. The severity of 
a disturbance, as well as its location, ap- 
pears not to have been contingent upon 
Negro living conditions or their social or 
economic status in a community. Not sur- 
prising, it is also the case that the effects 
of the control variables-nonwhite popu- 
lation size and South-were much the 
same in the two studies: large ghetto popu- 
lations provided the participants for fre- 
quent and for severe disturbances; also, 
net of this factor, a southern city tended 
to have fewer and less violent outbursts, 
possibly because Negroes in that region 
25 While this is not the place to review Morgan 
and Clark's analysis of the determinants of dis- 
order frequency, because that topic is intermixed 
in their paper with the severity study, a few 
salient comments seem in order. (1) Their at- 
tempt to select among explanations according to 
the magnitudes of correlation coefficients (Mor- 
gan and Clark, 1973:616-7) is in error. With 
N =42 observations (cities), the zero-order 
correlations in their Table 2 are not statistically 
different from one another, nor are the partial 
correlation coefficients different. In other words, 
in their data set, there is no basis for preferring 
one variable to another on statistical grounds. 
Also, I would point out that Morgan and Clark 
neglect to include a term for South which, as I 
have reported, (Spilerman, 1971:429) enhances 
the relation between disorder frequency and 
Negro population size. (2) Considering their rea- 
son for introducing city population size-to mea- 
sure the "opportunities . . . for social contacts 
that could precipitate a disorder" (Morgan and 
Clark, 1973:616)-they have used the wrong 
variable. The appropriate measure of disorder- 
precipitating contacts between whites and 
Negroes would be Tp(l-p), where T equals city 
population size and p equals proportion Negro 
in the population. (3) The matter of mixing dis- 
orders of different types (discussed in the text) 
is also material to this analysis, particularly in 
regard to the meaning of the variable Negro 
population size in instances of white-instigated 
aggression. 
26In our data set, incidentally, this variable 
turns out to be a weaker predictor of riot severity 
than nonwhite population size. While our princi- 
pal specification of the severity determinants 
(Table 5, equation 2) explains 13.4 percent of 
the variation in severity, if the nonwhite popula- 
tion term is replaced by log(city size) the R2 
value drops to 9.4 percent. 
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held lower expectations regarding improve- 
ments in their circumstances and were 
more fearful of retribution from participat- 
ing in racial protest. 
Taken together, these studies suggest 
that despite considerable differences in 
Negro circumstance from one city to the 
next, this consideration did not find ex- 
pression in the two aspects of the disturb- 
ance process that we have examined. Al- 
though we would not claim that local 
conditions never influenced disorder-prone- 
ness or disorder severity, we do assert the 
absence of a systematic tendency for either 
of these facets of the racial turmoil to be 
associated with the extent of Negro depri- 
vation in a community. This assessment is 
neither unreasonable nor counter-intuitive 
when viewed against other characteristics 
of the disturbances and against trends 
which were operative during the period. 
In particular, the incidents tended to clus- 
ter in time following a few dramatic events 
such as the massive Newark disorder in 
July, 1967, and the assassination of Martin 
Luther King in April, 1968. Also, the en- 
tire time* interval during which disorders 
occurred in large numbers was itself con- 
centrated within a few years in the mid- 
1960s. It is difficult to conceive of the 
kinds of developments in individual com- 
munities which could account for this sud- 
den and practically simultaneous occur- 
rence of hundreds of outbursts. 
We also can enumerate trends which 
functioned to produce a geographically 
uniform pattern of behavior by Negroes. 
For one, black consciousness and black 
solidarity were very real phenomena during 
the 1960s, having been stimulated by the 
imaginative and appealing tactics of civil 
rights activists in desegregating retail estab- 
lishments in the South and placing Negroes 
on the voter rolls. For another, various 
civil rights bills were before Congress dur- 
ing much of the decade; these were salient 
to Negroes in all communities and would 
have served to heighten their racial aware- 
ness and racial identification. Yet, the 
factor I would stress as being responsible 
in a most essential way for the outbreaks 
having occurred in great numbers and for 
community conditions having been irrele- 
vant to the disorder process is the wide 
availability of television and its network 
news structure. 
By bringing scenes of civil rights 
marches, demonstrations and sit-ins into 
every ghetto, television contributed in a 
fundamental way to the creation of a black 
solidarity that would transcend the boun- 
daries of community. Of more immediate 
relevance to the outbursts. the extensive 
media coverage accorded to many of the 
incidents, with the actions of participants 
depicted in full relief, served to familiarize 
Negroes elsewhere with the details of riot- 
ing and with the motivations of rioters. 
Observing the behavior of persons who 
face similar deprivations and must contend 
with the same discriminatory institutions as 
oneself-in short, individuals with whom 
the viewer could identify-provided a 
model of how he, too, might protest the 
indignities of his circumstance. By convey- 
ing the intensity and emotion of a con- 
frontation, television provided an essential 
mechanism for riot contagion; also, as a 
result of its national network structure, the 
provocations which arose in diverse set- 
tings were made visible in the ghettos of 
every city. 
The importance of television as a vehi- 
cle for the propagation of violent acts is 
not restricted to racial disorders. There 
is considerable evidence that skyjackings, 
prison riots, bomb threats and aggressive 
crimes of other sorts have been spread by 
television and the other mass media.27 In- 
deed, a question which eventually will have 
to concern this nation is the determination 
of a policy to guide the reporting of de- 
structive and potentially contagious events. 
However, the treacherous issue of media 
regulation is not a topic which need con- 
cern us here. 
APPENDIX I 
AUTOCORRELATION IN THE DISTURBANCES 
The results reported in Table 5 were 
estimated under the assumptions of the 
27 For references and additional discussion on 
this subject, see Spilerman (1975). 
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classical linear regression model. In par- 
ticular, we require in this model that 
E(ecje i) =0 for i #d j, where ecj is the 
error term corresponding to the severity of 
disorder j in city c. However, with time- 
series data it is frequently the case that 
the residuals from successive observations 
are correlated. For instance, factors not 
included in the regression equation that 
operated to influence the severity of the 
(i-l) -st incident may have persisted and 
affected the severity of the i-th incident as 
well. In this situation. although the least 
squares estimators of the regression co- 
efficients will be unbiased, the estimators 
of their variances will not have this prop- 
erty and conventional tests of hypotheses 
may lead to incorrect inferences. 
The severity data do not permit use of 
the Durbin-Watson statistic (Kmenta, 
1971:295) which is commonly employed 
in ascertaining serial correlation. The diffi- 
culty is that our data consist of pooled 
cross-sectional and time-series information 
and the time-series component (sequence of 
severity values for a city) is very short, 
never exceeding nine observations. More- 
over, the observations are not at equidistant 
time points. The Durbin-Watson test can- 
not be applied to data having these prop- 
erties, nor is any rigorous procedure known 
to us. Two, somewhat heuristic, alternative 
tests were used instead.28 
Method 1. We assume that the error 
terms for each city follow a first-order 
autoregressive scheme: 
ecu = pce,,j-l + uci, (A- ) 
j=2, . . . J,; c1=, . . ., C 
with E(ucjuci) = 0 for i #- j. This speci- 
cation frequently is made in the economet- 
rics literature and amounts to stating that 
the correlation between error terms is 
greatest for disorders which are adjacent 
in time. For tractibility we also assume 
that pc = p, i.e., the autoregressive process 
is identical in all cities. Treating (A-1) 
as a regression equation, the least squares 





C Jc (A-2) 
e2 J-1 
c=1 j=2 
where ecj is the residual from ordinary least 
squares applied to the main equation 
(model 1 in Table 5) and J, equals the 
number of disorders in city c. 
This procedure provided the estimate 
P=-.038 which, by a conventional t-test, 
is not significantly different from zero at 
the .10 level. 
Method 2. We again assume that serial 
correlation of the residuals can be specified 
by a first-order autoregressive scheme 
(equation A-1) and that Pc=p. Equation 
(1 ) of Table 5 may be written in the 
form 
ycj=a + bltej + b2PDcl + b3Cc + ecj 
(A-3) 
where tcj denotes a column vector of time 
interval dummies which correspond to the 
j-th disorder in city c; PDcj denotes a col- 
umn vector of terms for the number of 
previous disorders; Cc represents a column 
vector of community characteristics; and 
the big's are row vectors of appropriate 
sizes containing coefficients. The subscript 
j has been suppressed in the last column 
vector since the community characteristics 
are taken to be constant during the time 
period under consideration. 
If equation (A-3) is lagged so that the 
terms refer to the (j-l)-st disorder in city 
c and if this equation is multiplied by p 
and the resulting expression subtracted 
from (A-3) (see Kmenta, 1971:289 for 
an example of these calculations), we 
obtain after simplifying 
yj =a(l-p) +py,,_,,.+bltej-pblte, l, 
+b2PDj -pb2PDc.j_ l+bs(1p) Cc 
+ (e,,i- Pec. i -0 (A-4) 
The salient features about (A-4) are 
that p appears explicitly as the coefficient 
of yc.],j, and the residuals equal u, (see 
A-1) and are therefore serially uncorre- 
28 I wish to acknowledge a very helpful dis- 
cussion with Art Goldberger on this topic. 
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lated. Ordinary least squares estimators 
of the coefficients and their standard errors 
are asymptotically unbiased and may be 
used with a large sample to estimate p 
and test its significance. Neglecting one- 
disorder cities and first disorders in multi- 
ple disorder cities, this procedure provided 
the estimate - - .066 with a t-value of 
-0.61, which is not significantly different 
from zero at the .10 level. Thus, neither 
approach to assessing the significance of 
p supports the presence of serial correla- 
tion. 
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ON "QUALITY OF LIFE" * 
ELIHU M. GERSON 
Pragmatica Systems, Inc., San Francisco 
American Sociological Review 1976, Vol. 41 (October): 793-806 
Two traditional approaches to conceptualizing quality of life are distinguished: the indi- 
vidualist which, emphasizes the position and activities of individuals; and the tran- 
scendentalist, which emphasizes the overall order of society. Both of these approaches 
are shown to be inadequate because they presuppose the logical separation of individual 
and society. A third approach, which conceives of individuals and society generating 
each other via a continuing process of negotiation is proposed. Such an approach leads 
to a "quality of life" defined in terms of the outcomes of these negotiations; at a single 
point in time these are called the sovereignties of individuals and settings. Sovereignties 
are thus conceptualized as patterns of commitment made by individuals among settings, 
and conversely. It is suggested that these patterns of commitment be measured as the 
joint allocation of money, time, skill and sentiment by individuals and settings. Assess- 
ment of quality of life in chronic illness is used as an example. 
In the last ten years, the problem of 
defining and measuring "quality of life" 
has become more and more a problem ex- 
plicitly considered in public discourse. The 
trend in considerations entering into public 
policy debates has been to focus more and 
more on quality of life issues across a 
broad range of "functional" areas: health, 
housing, crime, "environment" and so on. 
Simultaneously, social scientists have begun 
to concern themselves with the technical 
issues involved in measuring quality of 
life, in collecting information which will 
make such measurement possible and in 
contributing to the formulation of policies 
based upon the notion that "quality of 
life" is something to be pursued as a matter 
of public policy, through public means. 
Despite this quickening of interest on 
the part of social scientists,' relatively little 
attention has been paid to the larger intel- 
lectual problems involved in making some 
technical assessment of quality of life. 
Rather, discussion and research have been 
pursued within a fairly narrow frame of 
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1 For example, the recent spate of "social indi- 
cators" literature (e.g., Bauer, 1966; Duncan, 
1969a; 1969b; Campbell and Converse, 1972; 
Wilcox et al., 1972). Dunn (1974) has reviewed 
and criticized many of the assumptions underly- 
ing this work. For other approaches to similar 
problems, see Bradburn, 1969; Strauss, 1975. 
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